Papers Jennifer Nado


 Jennifer Nado (forthcoming). “Who Wants to Know?” Oxford Studies in Epistemology.

Jennifer Nado (forthcoming). "Knowledge Second (for Metasemantics)". In A. Coliva and N. Pedersen, Epistemic Pluralism. Palgrave.

Jennifer Nado (2017). “Knowledge is not Enough”.  Australasian Journal of Philosophy. DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2016.1273959

Michael Johnson and Jennifer Nado (2017). “Actual vs. Counterfactual Dispositional Metasemantics: A Reply to Andow”Philosophia, 45:2, 717-734.

Jennifer Nado (2016). “Demythologizing Intuition”. Inquiry,  60:4, 386-402.

Jennifer Nado (2016). “Experimental Philosophy 2.0”. Thought, 5:3, 159-168.

Jennifer Nado (2016).  "The Intuition Deniers".  Philosophical Studies, 173:3, 781-800.

Michael Johnson and Jennifer Nado (2016). "Intuitions and the Theory of Reference".  In J. Nado, ed., Advances in Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology.

Jennifer Nado (2015).  “Philosophical Expertise and Scientific Expertise”. Philosophical Psychology, 28:7, 1026-1044.

Jennifer Nado (2015). “Intuition, Philosophical Theorising, and the Threat of Scepticism”.  In E. Fischer and J. Collins, eds., Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism: Rethinking Philosophical Method.  Routledge.  Pp. 204-221

Jennifer Nado (2014). “Philosophical Expertise”. Philosophy Compass, 9, 631-641.

Jennifer Nado and Michael Johnson (2014).  “Moderate Intuitionism: A Metasemantic Account”.   In A.R. Booth and D. Rowbottom, eds., Intuitions.  Oxford University Press.

Jennifer Nado (2014). “Why Intuition?”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89, 15-41.

Jennifer Nado (2014).  “The Role of Intuition”.  In J. Sytsma, ed., Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind.  Bloomsbury.

Jennifer Nado, Daniel Kelly, and Stephen Stich (2009). “Moral Judgements”. In P. Calvo and J. Simons, eds., The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology.  New York: Routledge.  Pp. 621-633.

Jennifer Nado (2008). “Effects of Moral Cognition on Judgments of Intentionality”. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59, 709-731.