Jennifer Nado (2021). “Classification procedures as the targets of conceptual engineering”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12843
Jennifer Nado (2021). “Re-engineering knowledge: a case study in pluralist conceptual engineering”. Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1903987
Jennifer Nado (2021). “Conceptual Engineering, Truth, and Efficacy.” Synthese, 198, 1507–1527.
Joachim Horvath and Jennifer Nado (2021). “Knowledge and Normality”. Synthese, 198, 11673–11694.
Jennifer Nado (2020). “Taking Control: Conceptual Engineering without (Much) Metasemantics”. Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1850342
Jennifer Nado (2020). “Philosophizing Out of Bounds”. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01582-0
Jennifer Nado (2019). “Conceptual Engineering via Experimental Philosophy.” Inquiry, 64:1-2, 76-96.
Jennifer Nado (2019). “Who Wants to Know?” In T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, eds., Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 6. Oxford University Press. Pp. 114-136.
Jennifer Nado (2017). "Knowledge Second (for Metaphilosophy)". In A. Coliva and N. Pedersen, eds., Epistemic Pluralism. Palgrave. Pp. 145-170.
Jennifer Nado (2017). "How to Think About Philosophical Methodology". Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 34, 447-463.
Jennifer Nado (2017). “Knowledge is not Enough”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95:4, 658-672.
Michael Johnson and Jennifer Nado (2017). “Actual vs. Counterfactual Dispositional Metasemantics: A Reply to Andow”. Philosophia, 45:2, 717-734.
+Jennifer Nado (2016). “Demythologizing Intuition”. Inquiry, 60:4, 386-402.
Jennifer Nado (2016). “Experimental Philosophy 2.0”. Thought, 5:3, 159-168.
Jennifer Nado (2016). "The Intuition Deniers". Philosophical Studies, 173:3, 781-800.
Michael Johnson and Jennifer Nado (2016). "Intuitions and the Theory of Reference". In J. Nado, ed., Advances in Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology.
Jennifer Nado (2015). “Philosophical Expertise and Scientific Expertise”. Philosophical Psychology, 28:7, 1026-1044.
Jennifer Nado (2015). “Intuition, Philosophical Theorising, and the Threat of Scepticism”. In E. Fischer and J. Collins, eds., Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism: Rethinking Philosophical Method. Routledge. Pp. 204-221
Jennifer Nado (2014). “Philosophical Expertise”. Philosophy Compass, 9, 631-641.
Jennifer Nado and Michael Johnson (2014). “Moderate Intuitionism: A Metasemantic Account”. In A.R. Booth and D. Rowbottom, eds., Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
Jennifer Nado (2014). “Why Intuition?”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89, 15-41.
Jennifer Nado (2014). “The Role of Intuition”. In J. Sytsma, ed., Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. Bloomsbury.
Jennifer Nado, Daniel Kelly, and Stephen Stich (2009). “Moral Judgements”. In P. Calvo and J. Simons, eds., The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. New York: Routledge. Pp. 621-633.
Jennifer Nado (2008). “Effects of Moral Cognition on Judgments of Intentionality”. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59, 709-731.